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waive his right to be presently compensated according to the standards set by the
act," he should likewise be unable to waive his back pay. Furthermore, subtle forms of
coercion difficult to prove, may be used by the employer. Even if the employer is financially unable immediately to pay the back wages due, waiver of back pay should
not be allowed because the administrator will agree to lenient installment payments
in the consent judgment, "2 or the courts, upon proof of financial incapacity, will ar3
range amicable settlements.

Procedure-Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Applicability to Enforcement of Administrative Subpoena--[Federal].-The National Labor Relations Board applied to
a federal district court for an order requiring the respondent corporation to obey subpoenas duces tecum issued by the board., The company, alleging that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure govern these proceedings, moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because no complaint had been filed nor summons issued as required by the
rules. Held, inter alia, that the Federal Rules are inapplicable.3 NLRB v. GoodyearTire
Rubber Co.4
Proceedings to enforce administrative subpoenas are not specifically excepted from
the operation of the Federal Rules by Rule 81. Hence, an inference may be drawn that
they are within the scope of the rules as "suits of a civil nature ....cognizable as
cases at law or in equity" under Rule i.
It may be argued, however, that the enabling act, which empowers the Supreme
Court to prescribe rules for "civil actions at law"s as well as for "suits in equity,"'6 does
not authorize the Court to dictate the practice in these statutory proceedings. The
(2d) 85i (S. Ct.
20 Cf. Emerson v. Mary Lincoln Candies, Inc., I73 Misc. 531, 17 N.Y.S.
1940).
2 The danger of the widespread use of "kickback" methods has been recognized by the
Federal Government (46 Stat. 1494 (i93i), as amended by 49 Stat. ioi1 (1935), 40 U.S.C.A.
§ 276(a) (Supp. i94o) ) and by New York (N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 1938) c. 39, § 962).
See also Fleming v. North Georgia Mfg. Co., 33 F. Supp. ioo5, ioo6 (Ga. 194o); Wage &
Hour Rel. No. R-9
9 (Nov. 21, 1938); 2 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv. 33,IIg (1940); 2 C.C.H.Lab.
Law Serv. 33,253 (1940).
"2Cf. principal case. See note i6 supra.
23Fleming v. Phipps, 35 F. Supp. 627 (Md. i94o); Fleming v. North Georgia Mfg. Co.,
33 F. Supp. ioo5 (Ga. i94o).
'49 Stat. 456 (Y935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 161(2) (Supp. 1940).
'Federal Rules 3 , 4.
3 In general see Applicability of the Federal Rules to Enforcement of Administrative Sub;.
poenas, 2 Fed. Rules Serv. z.5 i (I94O).
4 7 Lab. Rel. Rep. 363 (D.C. Ohio 194o). In issuing the enforcement order the court held
also that the evidence demanded relates to the matter under investigation before the board.
Cf. Cudahy Packing Co. v. NLRB, 34 F. Supp. 53 (Kan. i94o), aff'd 3 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv.
60,242 (C.C.A. xoth 1941); SEC v. Mallory (D.D.C. March 6, 1939), reported in Pike,
Cases on New Federal and Code Procedure 31-32 (1939).
548 Stat. io64 (1934), 28 U.S.C.A. § 723 (b) (Supp. 1940).
648 Stat. io64 (1934), 28 U.S.C.A. § 723(c) (Supp. 1940).
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enforcement procedure customarily followed involves an application by the administrative agency to a federal court, issuance by the court of an order to show cause, the
filing of an answer by the person subpoenaed, and a decision by the court whether to
issue an order requiring obedience to the subpoena. A refusal to obey such an order
subjects the person subpoenaed to the court's contempt powers.7 This procedure clearly has none of the characteristics of a "civil action at law"; rather it follows forms customary in equity.8 But in ICC v. Baird,9 the Supreme Court stated that a proceeding
to enforce an ICC subpoena was not a "suit in equity." Thus it may be urged that the
instant proceeding does not fall within the scope of Federal Rule i as a suit of a civil
nature cognizable as a case at law or in equityo A supporting analogy is found in several state codes which distinguish "civil actions" from "special proceedings" to which
the codes of civil procedure are inapplicable;" "special proceedings" are those actions
which were not cognizable as suits at law or in equity before the adoption of the codes.12
But the contention that the enabling act does not authorize the Supreme Court to
prescribe rules for any proceedings other than "civil actions at law" or "suits in equity"
implies that the specific exceptions made in Rule 8i (a)(1-7)swere unnecessary because,
in any event, the Court had no power to govern practice in such proceedings. It may
be argued, however, that the Supreme-Court has in the past broadly construed the
terms of the enabling act to empower it to prescribe rules for all "suits of a civil nature," meaning all civil actions as contrasted with criminal proceedings.14 No distinction is made in the Federal Rules between "civil actions" and "special proceedings";'s
therefore, under this view, it was necessary in the rules to make special exceptions for
proceedings to which the rules were inapplicable. But proceedings to enforce admin7 National Labor Relations Act § 11(2), 49 Stat. 456 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 161(2) (Supp.
1940).
8 See Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, 268 U.S. 61g, 621 (1925).

38 (19o4).
lo x Moore and Friedman, Federal Practice 49 (1938).
9 194 U.S. 25,

11Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1937) §§ 22, 23; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Ann. (Gilbert-Bliss,
§§ 4,5.
12 Boggs v. North American Bond & Mortgage Co., 20 Cal. App. (2d) 316, 66 P. (2d)
1253 (1937); In re Central Irrigation District, 117 Cal. 382, 49 Pac. 354 (1897); State v.
Steeley, 21 Ohio App. 396, 153 N.E. 285 (1926).
r3 E.g., proceedings in admiralty, bankruptcy, copyright, admission to citizenship, habeas
corpus, arbitration of railway labor disputes.
14 J Moore and Friedman, Federal Practice 40, 48 (1938).
The term "suit of a civil nature,"
which appears in § 24 of the Judicial Code (Rev. Stat. § 563 (1875), 28 U.S.C.A. §41 (1)
(1927)) and in the removal statute (i8 Stat. 470 (,875), 28 U.S.C.A. § 7, (1927)), has been
broadly construed. Milwaukee County v. White, 296 U.S. 268 (1935) ("suit of a civil nature"
contrasted with criminal action); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878); In re Chicago,
M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 5o F. (2d) 4 3 o (D.C. Minn. 1931).
X"
Most courts draw no such distinction in proceedings against the United States under
the Tucker Act (24 Stat. 505 (1887), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(20) (1927)): Sherwood v. United
States, 112 F. (2d) 587 (C.C.A. 2d 1940); Boerner v. United States, 26 F. Supp. 769 (N.Y.
1939). Contra: Lynn v. United States, iio F. (2d) 586 (C.C.A. 5th 1940). But Federal Rules
4(d)(4) and i2(a) refer specifically to procedure in actions against the United States.
1926)
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istrative subpoenas, which have been referred to as "civil actions"' 6 and "direct civil
proceedings,"? were not so excepted.
Even conceding, however, that subpoena-enforcement proceedings are suits of a
civil nature as defined in Rule i, a reasonable interpretation of the Federal Rules does
not require their application to proceedings to enforce administrative subpoenas. The
Advisory Committee's note to Rule 45 states: "This rule applies to subpoenas ....
issued by the district courts. It does not apply to the enforcement of subpoenas issued
by administrative officers ....pursuant to statutory authority. The enforcement of
such subpoenas by the district courts is regulated by appropriate statutes [listing nineteen statutes including Section 11(2) of the National Labor Relations Act]." The respondent contended in the instant case that the note refers only to Rule 45 but does
not relate to the applicability of the Federal Rules, in general, to these proceedings. 8
But it may be argued that the note, particularly the third sentence therein, is pointless
if it is not interpreted as intending to exclude these proceedings from the operation of
all the rules,9
Furthermore, Rule 8I(a)(5), which excepts Sections 920 and io"2 of the National
Labor Relations Act from the procedure prescribed in the rules, provides that "in respects not covered by those statutes, the practice ....shall conform to these rules so
far as applicable."2 It may be argued that the procedure prescribed by the Federal
Rules is not conducive to the end sought in the judicial enforcement of administrative subpoenas-to secure the most rapid and effective disposal of the matter before the board consistent with the least possible inconvenience to the private person.23
It seems apparent that the application of the Federal Rules to the instant proceeding
would afford additional opportunity to delay the court's decision whether an enforcing
order should issue. The filing of complaint,24 the service of summons,25 the twenty days
v. Railway Labor Board, 268 U.S. 61g, 621 (1925).
v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 470 (,894).
18 Brief of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., at 21.
'9 The fact that the note to Rule 45 did not appear before the final draft of the Federal
Rules may be significant. Cf. preliminary draft, Rules of Civil Procedure (May 1936) note to
Rule 5i (subpoenas).
6 Robertson

17ICC

2049 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159 (Supp. i94o).

"Italics added.
23Miller, A Judge Looks at Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations, 26 A.B.A.J.
5, 7 (x94o).
'4 Federal Rule 3. It may be argued that, if the Federal Rules apply to these proceedings
at all, Rule 7(b)(i) should govern. It states that "an application to the court for an order
shall be by motion," language which is similar to that of §11 (2) of the National Labor Relations
Act (49 Stat. 456 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 16i (2)(Supp. 1940) ), providing that "any district
court ....upon applicationby the Board shall have jurisdiction to issue an order." See NLRB
v. Cudahy Packing Co., 34 F. Supp. 53, 6o (Kan. i94o). On the other hand, it may be urged
that Rule 7(b)(i) applies only to motions made to the court after the court has obtained
jurisdiction through compliance with Rules 3 and 4. This view is supported by the fact that
"order" in Rule 7(b)(i) includes non-appealable interlocutory orders of the court while the
"order" sought by the board is "an order from which an appeal lies." Rule 54(a) (defining
"judgment"); ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
" Federal Rule 4.
249 Stat. 454 (i935), 29 U.S.C.A. § i6o(e), (f), (g)(Supp. 1940).
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allowed within which to answer,26 the privilege of amending pleadings,27 the procrastinating possibilities of the deposition-discovery procedure, 8 the examination of witnesses,29 the court's entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law,30 and the motion
to amend such fndings3x provide avenues for dilatory tactics by counsel. Nor does the
provision for summary judgment32 appear to balance this disadvantage.
Refusal to apply the Federal Rules to the instant proceeding does not deprive the
respondent of an adequate hearing upon the issue before the court. Under the enforcement procedure followed prior t033 the promulgation of the Federal Rules, the
respondent could file pleadings in answer to the court's order to show cause, move for
extensions of time, request oral argument, and appeal.34 In fact, the delay implicit in
resort to the courts for enforcement of administrative subpoenas3s has led to the imposition of fines for refusal to comply,36 severe penalties for not keeping records available
to the regulating agency, 37 and the suggestion that the administrative tribunals be
granted contempt powers with which to enforce their own subpoenas.38 Nevertheless,
despite the possible delay under present practice, it must be noted that the procedure
is, in large degree, summary within the discretion of the court; 39 it is not crystallized
by formal rules of practice.
"Federal Rule X2(a). Compare this rule with the five to ten days allowed to answer an
order to show cause why the subpoena should not be enforced. The respondent who has
failed to comply with the NLRB subpoena cannot complain that he is injured by the shorter
period. He has had notice that the subpoena was issued prior to the court's service of the
order to show cause, and, indeed, his refusal to comply should imply an adequate defense to
an application to the court for enforcement.
27 Federal Rule 15.
2&Federal Rules 26-37.
29 Federal Rule 43.
30 Federal Rule 52(a). Findings of fact and conclusions of law have apparently never been
entered by courts enforcing administrative subpoenas in cases involving the NLRB, SEC,
FTC, and Wage and Hour Division. See the NLRB's Opposition to Entry of Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of the Law (in the instant litigation).
31 Federal Rule 52(b).
32Federal Rule 56. This rule provides that either party to a civil action, which is already
under the court's jurisdiction, may move for judgment at any time after the pleadings are filed.
33 Reply Memorandum of the NLRB, at 2.
34 Administrative Sanctions-Power of Federal Commissions to Compel Testimony and the
Production of Evidence, .5 Harv. L. Rev. 312, 36 (1937).
3s An extreme case is the seven-year period between the issuance of an FTC subpoena in
an investigation of bread prices and the court order compelling witnesses to testify. FTC v.
Millers' Nat'l Federation, 47 F. (2d) 428 (App. D.C. 1931).
36 E.g., Interstate Commerce Commission, 27 Stat. 443 (1893), 49 U.S.C.A. § 46 (1929);
Federal Trade Commission, 38 Stat. 723 (ip14), iS U.S.C.A. § 50 (1927); Securities and Exchange Commission, 48 Stat. 900 (1934), iS U.S.C.A. § 78u(c) (Supp. 1940).
37 Commodity Exchange Act, 42 Stat. 998 (1922), 7 U.S.C.A., §§ 1-17 (r939); Securities
Act of 1933; 48 Stat. 77, 84, 87 (1933), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(e)(l)(x) (Supp. 194o); Fair Labor
Standards Acts, 52 Stat. io66, io68-69 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 211, 215, 216 (Supp. i94o).
38 Albertsworth, Administrative Contempt Powers: A Problem in Technique, 25 A.B.A.J.
954 (1939).
39 SEC v. Mallory (D.D.C. March 16, 1939), reported in Pike, Cases on New Federal and
Code Procedure 31-32 (z939).

